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It is now more than twenty years since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning
of transition to a market economy. The non-market, ‘planned’ economic system of the old
order had its own speciﬁc mode of functioning, which over time had a profound impact on
the structure of the economy. The article explores the extent to which the far-reaching
economic transformation undertaken in post-communist Russia since the end of 1991
has overcome the legacies of the Soviet system. Has the socialist economic order that
existed for over sixty years disappeared entirely, or are there still survivals and legacies
that shape and inﬂuence, at least in part, the present-day Russian economy? These issues
are examined by focussing on one particular sector that played a dominant role in the
USSR, namely the defence industry and the military economy more generally. It is
concluded that there are indeed signiﬁcant survivals and legacies of the socialist past:
market transformation is still incomplete.
Copyright  2012, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
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The Soviet economic system came to an end with the
collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of communist
rule in the ﬁnal days of 1991. In the author’s view, economic
collapse was not the cause of the end of the communist
order, although without doubt the economic systemwas in
very serious crisis at the time. An already dysfunctional
economy had been disorganised and weakened further by
reforms undertaken in the name of perestroika by Mikhail
Gorbachev and his government. But it was political factors
above all that ended communist rule and the USSR and, as
has been argued, the economic system could possibly have
lived on, albeit in as an ineffective and poorly performingnyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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with market forces.1 In the event, the new government of
an independent Russian Federation, led by Yegor Gaidar,
embarked on a difﬁcult process of market transformation,
at least in the short-term, costly in human terms.
Now, over twenty years later, it is instructive to consider
just how far this market transformation has progressed.
Does Russia nowpossess a fully functional market economy
genuinely comparable with much longer established
economies ofWestern Europe or the United States? Has the
socialist economic order that prevailed for some sixty years
disappeared entirely, so that it is now receding into
memory of interest only to historians? Or has it left
survivals and legacies that shape and inﬂuence, at least in
part, Russia’s present-day economy? These issues will be
explored in the present article, which draws to some extent
on the experience of one particular sector of the economy;
a sector that in Soviet times could be considered by some
criteria relatively successful. This is the defence industry, or
the military economy more generally, which proved able in
the USSR to secure nuclear parity with the United States
and a conventional capability that throughout most of the
post-war years presented a challenge to NATO member
countries.3 See Kornai (1992, pp. 134–8). In this discussion we here leave out of2. Through the prism of Kornai, Yaremenko and
Shlykov
One of the most insightful analyses of the socialist
economic system is that of the Hungarian economist János
Kornai.2 He demonstrated that this was an economic order
exhibiting considerable coherence and, as a result, pos-
sessing resistance to reform initiatives. For Kornai, funda-
mental was the ideological commitment to the state
ownership of the basic productive assets of a society,
considered superior, economically and socially, to private
ownership. Given the predominance of state ownership of
enterprises and organisations, it was necessary to create an
administrative framework for their management, usually
taking the form of hierarchically structured ministries.
Preference for state ownership was accompanied by
a profound distrust of the spontaneous functioning of the
market. Material resources were allocated by administra-
tive, non-market, means. Only labour, recognising the need
to permit freedom of choice of occupation and workplace,
was allocated to some extent by market means in most
socialist economies, labour being the sphere of a highly
regulated quasi-market. In this system prices played
a secondary role and were not determined by the free play
of supply and demand, but were ﬁxed by administrative
means, usually according to a relatively primitive form of
cost-plus pricing, including a proﬁt element varied by
branch of economic activity in an arbitrary manner, inﬂu-
enced to a large degree by the needs of state budgetary
policy. This was a redistributive economic regime: the state1 See, e.g. Ellman and Kontorovich (1998). However, the present author
regards this possibility with scepticism.
2 See Kornai (1992), The Socialist System. The Political Economy of
Communism, Oxford: Clarendon Press.reallocated resources from ‘proﬁtable’ branches of the
economy to other activities having higher priority for the
Communist Party leadership. This was possible because of
the discretion of the state in ﬁxing prices and the very
substantial role played in the economy by the state budget,
which funded a large proportion of investment plus diverse
subsidies to both producers and consumers.3 This redis-
tribution took a non-transparent form, not the least those
forms of redistribution relating to the military economy.4
Following the conceptualisation of Kornai, certain
fundamental characteristics of the socialist economic
system can be identiﬁed.5 Firstly, state property predomi-
nated; if a private sector existed then it was on a modest
scale and restricted to economic activities not regarded as
having priority. Secondly, the predominance of bureaucratic
coordination, with ‘planning’ and hierarchical, vertical,
relations as opposed to the horizontal relations of an
economy subject to market coordination. In such a system
there was a total absence of competition in the domestic
economy, the creation, rise and (very rare) fall of an enter-
prise was entirely a matter of a government policy decision.
Thirdly, the ‘politicisation’ of the economy in the sense that
the Party and state were actively and inseparably involved
in real economic activity at all levels from theministries and
other economic agencies at the apex of the system to the
enterprises, mines and farms at the bottom. These relations
were associated with certain interests and behaviour of the
actors involved. For the leadership, output maximisation
was the overriding goal, quantity valued more, on the
whole, than quality. Bargaining relations were universal,
whether over plan targets, investment allocations, or the
volume and type of resources available for current
production activity. But central to the behaviour and
performance of the system were soft budget constraints at
the enterprise level. While enterprises were expected to
minimise costs and earn a proﬁt, with proﬁtability a plan
indicator inﬂuencing the scale of managerial bonuses, all
understood that there were never be any question of
bankruptcy, losses would be covered by intra-ministerial
cross subsidisation or direct budget allocations. More
generally, losses could be avoided by softening budget
constraints to permit proﬁtable operation andheremultiple
avenues were available for bargaining between the enter-
prise management and superior authorities, over plan
targets, prices, taxes, subsidies, etc. In Kornai’s view, many
behavioural characteristics of the system stemmed directly
from the existence of soft budget constraints in the
production sphere, but not for households, which experi-
enced hard budget constraints: investment ‘hunger’,
quantity drive, neglect of quality and innovation, excess
demand for resources of all kinds, including labour, and the
fact that the socialist economy was one of all pervasive
shortage (and, also, slack, as underutilisation of resourcesaccount the informal ‘second’ economy, which operated on market
principles, supplementing the ofﬁcial economy.
4 The term ‘military economy’ is used here to cover the economic
dimension of all aspects of military power, including military expendi-
ture, the defence industry, procurement of armaments and arms exports.
5 See Kornai (1992), pp.360–79.
6 Signiﬁcantly when a fuller version of the defence budget was even-
tually published in 1989, it did not include spending on mobilisation
preparation of the economy. The system still exists in present-day Russia,
albeit on a reduced scale, but the modest amount of funding allocated to
it is now included in the budget chapter ‘national defence.’
7 Shlykov (2002), p.149 (‘.the economic collapse of the USSR was
a consequence in the ﬁrst instance of the system of mobilisation prepa-
ration of the economy.’).
8 See Cooper (1991).
9 Data from Cooper (2006), p.132–3.
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the ‘planned’ economywas the existence and functioning of
a priority system. Although never stated formally in any
Party or government document, it was generally under-
stood that certain sectors of the economy were considered
more important than others and, as such, would be
provided with more favourable conditions, including softer
budget constraints than typical of lower priority sectors.
Kornai’s understanding of the Socialist economic system
in general can be supplemented by the insights of another
talented economist, who advanced his own theory derived
from his attempts to understand the speciﬁc features of the
Soviet economic order, in particular its characteristic
structural features. This was the late Yurii Yaremenko
(1935–1996), perhaps the most innovative of all econo-
mists working in the USSR in its ﬁnal twenty years, from
1987 director of the Institute of National Economic Fore-
casting of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In his major work,
Yaremenko (1981), originally published in a heavily
censored and abbreviated form, he analysed the Soviet
economy in terms of a hierarchical, multilevel system, with
each level having access to resources, human and material,
differentiated by quality. The qualitative heterogeneity of
resources became ﬁrmly institutionalised. An individual
enterprise, or entire branch of production, could rise up the
hierarchy and secure access to higher quality resources
only by a policy decision of the political-economic
authorities. Lower level sectors habitually deprived of
high quality resources compensated by resort to larger
quantities of lower quality inputs, e.g. inferior grade
materials, inferior production equipment or less skilled
labour. In the absence of prices determined by market
forces, the authorities were able to set prices that failed to
reﬂect this qualitative heterogeneity of resources: quality
inputs consumed by the select high grade sectors were
often underpriced. At the upper levels, occupied by the
defence industry and some priority civil sectors, higher
quality resources permitted the use and development of
more advanced technologies, but innovations possible in
these privileged conditions were unsuited to diffusion to
lower levels of the economy, lacking an appropriate
resource environment for their application. In Yaremenko’s
view, this structural deformation of the Soviet economy
developed as central control of the economy weakened in
the post war years and ‘departmentalism’ became ever
more pronounced, the most powerful administrative
interests being those of the defence industry and the
sectors supplying its needs. Over time, these priority
sectors became increasingly separate from the rest of the
economy and able to pursue their own interests relatively
unchecked by central state power.
Yaremenko’s argument was taken further by a leading
Soviet/Russian authority onmilitary matters, the late Vitalii
Shlykov (1934–2011), a former military intelligence ofﬁcer.
It was Shlykov who coined the term ‘structural milita-
risation’ to characterise the state of the Soviet economy
(Shlykov, 1995). He worked for over thirty years in the GRU
(Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff) as
a specialist on the defence industries of the USA and other
NATO member countries and was the ﬁrst in the USSR to
focus public attention of on the extraordinarily elaboratesystem of mobilisation preparation that had developed in
the country from the 1930s. In the USSR countless enter-
prises, military and civilian, were obliged to maintain
substantial spare production capacities to be engaged
rapidly in the manufacture of armaments or other military-
related goods in the event of war or national emergency,
the so-called ‘special period’. In order to undertake such
production, enterprises were also required to stockpile
materials, components and other inputs, and to ensure that
workers were properly trained to switch to military work if
required. In the European part of the country, these
reserves had to be sufﬁcient for three months of wartime
production; in the Asian part, six months. This extraordi-
narily elaborate and costly system was shrouded in almost
total secrecy.6 As Shlykov persuasively argued, this system
had an impact on the whole economy, not just the defence
industry. Mobilisation plans could involve preparation for
potential increases in military output of ten times or more.
In order to supply this production, the metals industry,
civilian machine building and the energy sector, and other
industries providing inputs, also had to maintain spare
capacities and in some cases keep them in day-to-day
operation in the event of need. This was an extraordi-
narily wasteful system, giving rise to massive spare
capacity and low levels of productivity, over time deep-
ening the structural distortions of the economy. In Shly-
kov’s opinion this ‘structural militarisation’ played
a signiﬁcant role in the weakening and eventual failure of
the Soviet economic system.73. The Soviet military economy
In the Soviet economy from the early 1930s the highest
priority sector was the military economy and within that
the defence industry, like the rest of Soviet industry
entirely state owned.8 By 1990 it employed over 8 million
people, including almost 1.5 million in research and
development (R&D). This was over 19 per cent of total
industrial employment. Its output represented 12 per cent
of the total output of industry as a whole. But the defence
industry also manufactured many civilian goods, in
particular those of a relatively high technological level.
Indeed, almost all high technology manufacturing in the
USSR was undertaken within the defence sector; in 1990
half the industry’s total productionwas of civil goods. In the
same year almost 80 per cent of all industrial R&D under-
taken in the country was performed by the defence
industry and almost 70 per cent of this was for military
purposes.9 Over decades the industry enjoyed top priority
in resource allocation, not simply in terms of quantity, but
11 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition
Report, 1997 and 2010. Note, in other ex-communist economies the state
share in 2010 was much lower, e.g. only 20 per cent in Estonia, Hungary
and the Slovak Republic; 25 per cent in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
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available material and equipment inputs and, as the fav-
oured sector, secured with ﬁnancial resources permitting
the payment of relatively high salaries and wages. The
attraction, training and retention of skilled personnel, from
designers and engineers to machine tool operators, was
vital to the industry’s relative success and to make this
possible the enterprises of the industry were resourced in
such a way as to permit the development around them of
housing, educational, medical and cultural-sporting facili-
ties of an unusually high standard in Soviet conditions.
Notably in the nuclear industry, but also in other ministries,
there were special distribution networks making available
to employees food products and consumer goods scarce in
the normal state shops. Therewas also a bias to the creation
of very large enterprises, sometimes employing tens of
thousands of workers, often with a high degree of self-
reliance, minimising the possibility of the supply break-
downs so characteristic of the Soviet economy. Some large
enterprises even had their own steel works and produced
their own specialised production equipment. In this respect
the defence industry was not unique. A distinctive feature
of the Soviet economy was the extraordinarily low level of
sub-contracting. Especially in the engineering industry,
enterprises made in-house many components and systems
that in a typical market economywould have been supplied
by independent, specialised, companies, often small in
scale.10 This is a major reason why in the Soviet economy
there were very few small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
Not only were many defence enterprises very large, but
quite a few dominated the local economies of entire pop-
ulation centres and in some cases were the centres of so-
called ‘monotowns’, with only a single or very limited
number of employers, often located, for security reasons, in
remote areas of the country. In the case of the nuclear
weapons industry, in particular, some of these towns were
‘closed’, i.e. they had highly restricted access and their
inhabitants had strictly regulated contact with the rest of
the country, though they were usually compensated by
relatively good housing and pay.
The Soviet economic system was a producer-driven
order, with very weak customer power. It was a sellers’
market in which even goods of inferior quality found
buyers. This state of affairs was also typical of the military
economy, even though the customer, the armed forces, was
granted some consumer powers not available in other
sectors. The defence industry was to a large extent able to
determine the types of weapons supplied to the armed
forces and their volume. However, the military were
involved in establishing the speciﬁcations of new arma-
ments and were able to exercise some inﬂuence over the
quality of their manufacture through a system of so-called
‘military representatives’ located at enterprises and R&D
organisations to monitor their work on behalf of the armed
forces customer. But this system had many problems and
only in the late Gorbachev years were the military able
openly to voice their discontents with this one-sided arms10 This phenomenon dates back to the 1930s, when the administered
supply system was ﬁrst adopted; for a classic analysis see Granick (1967).procurement system. Unlike the rest of the economy,
however, the defence sector was subject to a form of
competitive pressure: for the Party andmilitary leaderships
it was considered essential to match the technological
innovations of potential adversaries. To this end, efforts
were made to provide the defence industry with conditions
and incentives that would make this possible, including
generous rewards, monetary and non-monetary, for
successful scientists, designers and engineers.
4. The Russian economy today
Since the beginning of 1991 the Russian economy has
been transformed to a very signiﬁcant degree. The large-
scale privatisation campaign of the early to mid-1990s
ended the predominance of state ownership in industry,
prices were freed to ﬁnd their own market level and many
market-orientated institutions were established. The mili-
tary economywas not immune from these reforms; indeed,
they had a major impact on the defence industry and its
performance. Looking at today’s Russian economy from the
perspective of the theoretical insights of Kornai and
Yaremenko, can it be said that market transformation has
been fully achieved? Or are there survivals and legacies of
the communist past that still shape the economy or exert
an inﬂuence on current practice? These issues will now be
explored, drawing to some extent on the current state of
the military economy and its mode of functioning in the
new Russia.
Statistics on the overall share of the private sector in the
Russian economy is unsatisfactory and contradictory,
making it difﬁcult to establish the true situation at present
and trends over time. However, the evidence suggests that
the state share has actually increased since the late 1990s.
Thus, according to the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, the share of the state sector in GDP
increased from 30 per cent in 1997 to 35 per cent in 2010.11
The ‘Expert’ ratings agency undertakes an annual review of
Russia’s largest companies. According to their analysis of
the 400 largest companies in the country at the beginning
of 2008, the state ownership share amounted to 40–45
per cent.12
5. The Russian military economy
Taking the defence industry, in 2007 no less that 49 per
cent of enterprises and organisations were fully state-
owned, 27 per cent had state ownership participation and
only 24 per cent were fully private.13 Given that almost all
very large enterprises are fully state owned and private
companies tend to be of a smaller scale, the state share ofBulgaria, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania and Poland.
12 http://2020strategy.ru/g15/news/32589616.html, Presentation, 19 July
2011, slide 4.
13 http://www.vpk.ru, accessed 15 June 2009 (Information Agency Ts
VPK).
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ﬁgures suggest. Indeed, the available data indicate that 58
per cent of defence industry employees work in the ‘state
sector’, undeﬁned, but apparently meaning at fully state-
owned enterprises.14 While state participation in West
European defence industries can be quite substantial, the
extent of state predominance in Russia is exceptional. Since
about 1997 the state presence has actually increased, partly
because a number of private companies have withdrawn
from military work and also because there has also been
a process of state consolidation, reﬂecting more general
trends in the economy.
In another respect the defence industry retains features
of the Soviet past. It remains a sector in which soft budget
constraints are still very much present. This raises an issue
that has been rather neglected by researchers, namely the
extent to which in the Russian economy in general soft
budget constraints still have prevalence. Certainly, during
the years 1992–1998, prior to the August ﬁnancial crisis of
that year, Russian enterprises exhibited extraordinary
ingenuity in maintaining soft budget constraints, resorting
to diverse forms of non-monetary transacting, generally
summarised as ‘barter’, which permitted unproﬁtable
enterprises to survive without facing bankruptcy and
closure.15 It is also a surprising feature of the present-day
Russian economy that quite a large proportion of enter-
prises are reported to be loss-making, a proportion that
remains high and leads to a suspicion that by various
means they are allowed to remain in operation regardless
of their lack of ﬁnancial viability.
Thus in the ﬁrst half of 2011 34.7 per cent of all enter-
prises and organisations were loss making, including 33.7
per cent of those in manufacturing industry.16 This
compares with 36.4 per cent and 36.6 per cent respectively
in 2005, indicating some progress, but it is still a surpris-
ingly large proportion.17 At ﬁrst sight, the performance of
the defence industry appears to be superior: in 2005, 24.4
per cent of enterprises were loss-making (excluding
nuclear industry), and 20.8 per cent in 2008.18 Of loss-
making enterprises in 2007, over 65 per cent had been in
that state for two years or more. The largest losses were
made by two well known enterprises, ‘Sevmash’ of Sever-
odvinsk, the country’s sole producer of nuclear submarines,
and the ‘MiG’ corporation, producing combat aircraft.19
However, the fact that the share of loss-making enter-
prises in the defence industry is relatively low probably has
a simple explanation: as enterprises considered ‘strategic’
by the state, they have access to means of support not14 Ibid.
15 For a good analysis of this phenomenon, in which the government
was perhaps complicit in so far as it reduced the danger of outbreaks of
social discontent, see OECD (2000), Section II.
16 http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04_03/Isswww.exe/Stg/d02/187.htm,
accessed 12 September 2011.
17 Finansy Rossii – 2008 g. (http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b08_51/Main.
htm).
18 http://ia/vpk/ru/localfonds/vpk_struct_demo/2005/page_8_html,
accessed 9 November 2011 and http://www.vpk.ru, accessed 16 February
2011.
19 http://ww.vpk.ru, accessed 13 September 2011.available to others, i.e. they experience relatively soft
budget constraints. Indeed, the defence industry has
a number of channels by which support is made available.
Firstly, the defence industry is eligible for direct budget
subsidies and other forms of ﬁnancial support from the
centre. As of 2011, there were twelve basic forms of budget
support for defence industry enterprises.20 They ranged
from budget funds to boost the capital of enterprises ful-
ﬁlling state defence orders, beneﬁciaries of which have
included the ‘United Aviation Corporation’ and the Nizhnii
Tagil’ ‘Uralvagonzavod’, the country’s sole producer of
tanks. Some munitions producing enterprises are so-called
‘treasury’ enterprises, surviving on direct budget handouts.
Enterprises engaged in export activity are eligible for
budget subsidies to cover part of the interest charges
imposed by credit organisations, as are some enterprises
acting as prime contractors in fulﬁlling state defence
orders, enterprises engaged in certain innovation and
investment projects involving high-technology, and
producers of aircraft and aero-engines undertaking tech-
nical re-equipment. In addition, the above mentioned
‘Sevmash’ received special subsidies in 2006–08 to reduce
interest payments incurred in fulﬁlling state defence
orders. Finally, there are now at least three different
channels by which defence industry enterprises can obtain
state guarantees when obtaining credits relating to their
military work.21 The total budget funding involved is not
insubstantial: excluding the substantial recapitalisation
allocations associated mainly with the countering the
impact of the global ﬁnancial crisis, in 2008 subsidies
amounted to over 5 billion roubles and in 2009 over 20 b.r.
Data for 2010 are incomplete, excluding export subsidies, in
2009 over 6.5 b.r., but amounted to over 9 b.r. In 2009 143
b.r. budget funding was used to recapitalise enterprises; in
2010 57 b.r.22 What is not clear is the extent to which there
are also various forms of budget support at a sub-federal
level, from republican and regional budgets.
Secondly, there is a less transparent means by which
soft budget constraints can be maintained. It has been
ofﬁcial policy for a number of years to form so-called
integrated structures’ in the defence industry. In 2003
there were 18 such structures, by 2011 55, with more to be
created.23 The declared justiﬁcation for the creation of
corporations and holding companies has been the need to
match the large international companies of the USA and
Europe in the international armaments market. However, it
is generally understood that such corporate structures have
another beneﬁt: they create a framework in which cross
subsidisation of enterprises can take place, moreover in
a non-transparent manner. The most striking example is
the state corporation, ‘Rostekhnologii’, created at the end of
2007. This brought together into a single structure no less
than 442 enterprises, approximately one third of which
were bankrupt of in a dire ﬁnancial state. Now the20 http://www.vpk.ru/cgi-bin/uis/w3.cgi/CMS/Item/2540032, accessed
13 September 2011.
21 Ibid.
22 Calculated from data of Ibid.
23 Karavaev (2012).
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600,000 people, including 330 in the defence industry,
accounting for almost a quarter of the industry’s total
output.24 However, ‘Rostekhnologii’ also includes the
highly proﬁtable state arms export company ‘Rosobor-
oneskport’, which gives ample scope for cross subsidisation
to keep the ﬁnancially non-viable enterprises in operation.
The combination of loss-making and proﬁtable ﬁrms in this
way also applies to other large corporate structures,
including the ‘United Aircraft Corporation’, the ‘United
Shipbuilding Corporation’ and ‘Almaz-Antei’, Russia’s
producer of air defence systems.25 In this respect they
resemble the former ministries of Soviet industry; indeed,
‘Rostekhnologii’ is even of a scale comparable to that of
a large ministry of the Soviet era.
The discussion has focused on the defence industry but
it relates to a broader issue, the extent to which soft budget
constraints are a feature of the rest of the Russian economy.
In the author’s view they are probably quite pervasive, and
not always in obvious forms. Then Russian economy is
dominated by a relatively small number of very large
corporations in the fuel-energy sector, metals and other
resource-based activities. These companies are usually
highly proﬁtable and as a matter of course, in the name of
‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR), are generous in their
funding of various social and cultural projects and, it is
generally believed, are willing to fund political initiatives of
the government on the understanding that this will ensure
a supportive stance by the state towards their corporate
activities.26 In the words of Guriev and Tsyvinskii, ’.for
companies CSR is becoming an instrument of forming
relations with the state.’27 For these companies budget
constraints are hardly an issue; for all practical purposes
they are soft. This relates to the federal level but there are
grounds for suspecting that a similar situation also applies
to larger, proﬁtable, businesses at the republican and
regional level. This may also permit regionally-focused
cross subsidisation, whereby ‘donations’ from proﬁtable
ﬁrms end up being used to support less viable companies
considered worthy of support at a local level on social or
other grounds. To this extent the Russian economy prob-
ably still possesses a signiﬁcant characteristic of its Soviet
forebear, albeit on a less pronounced scale. But it is not
a shortage economy as it was in Soviet times. Most
households, but by no means all, still experience hard
budget constraints. It is not daily shortages that are expe-
rienced but inﬂation, eroding real purchasing power, which
has been a persistent feature of the post-1991 economy.24 http://www.rostechn.ru/archive/3/detail.php?ID¼7403 (interview
with Sergei Chemezov, general director); http://www.rostechn.ru/
upload/content/strategy.pdf (strategy to 2020, p.5) and http://www.
rostechn.ru/company/about/, accessed 13 September 2011.
25 However, by international standards, Russia’s defence industry corpo-
rations are of relativelymodest scale in termsof their volumeof sales. SIPRI’s
listing of the top 100 arms-producing companies of the world (excluding
China) in 2009 by arms sales, included only six Russian companies, the
largest being‘ Almaz-Antei’, ranked 23rd with sales just over 10 per cent
those of the leader, Lockheed Martin (SIPRI 2011, pp.257–61).
26 On the speciﬁc nature of corporate social responsibility in Russian,
see Mizobata (2011).
27 Guriev and Tsyvinskii (2011).Perhaps this is at least in part the ‘price’ paid for the Russian
government’s acceptance of the survival of soft budget
constraints.28
In the author’s view, the prevalence of soft budget
constraints helps to account for other striking features of
the present-day Russian economy, namely the low level of
competition and the modest scale, by international stan-
dards, of innovation.29 For many Russian ﬁrms competitive
pressure is weak, limiting the incentive to adopt new
products or cost-reducing processes. According to the
World Economic Forum, Russia’s position in their global
competitiveness ranking has remained low over the past
decade and shows little sign of improving. In the latest
2011–12 ranking, Russia was placed 66th of 142 countries
covered, below such comparators as China, Brazil, Turkey
andMexico, not to speak of the Republic of Korea, in 24th.30
As for innovation, the interim report of the group of
economists engaged in developing a revised strategy of
socio-economic development of Russia to 2020, looking to
the future sums up the situation as follows, ‘the level of
innovativeness of the economy as a whole and the inno-
vativeness of concrete branches, in particular, will be
determined by the general level of competition in the
economy and concrete branches.’ But the authors of this
document also show a keen awareness of the problems of
the high-technology sector, ‘.in the framework of the
planned economy these sectors (armaments, space, nuclear
power, aircraft building – jmc) developed in a situation of
high competition (the requirement was the achievement of
world leadership or parity with the USA), but – simulta-
neously – extremely soft budget constraints (priority
ﬁnancing “on demand”). With these have been linked
signiﬁcant difﬁculties of the transition of these sectors to
market rails and inclusion in present-day international
competition, which is competition not only of quality, but
also of costs. In the 1990s these sectors suffered from a lack
of ﬁnancing, however the 2000s showed that the growth of
ﬁnancing did not lead to a proportional improvement of
competitiveness.31 However, the authors fail to acknowl-
edge that even today the budget constraints in these
sectors are not always hard, i.e. one of the two identiﬁed
Soviet characteristics is still to some extent present,
although the other, constant pressure by the (communist)
political leadership and state for new achievements, no
longer functions, to the frustration, one senses, of the
current political elite. The fact that the Russian economy is
still not very innovative and has considerable technological
backwardness in many ﬁelds will offer plenty of scope for
foreign exporters and investors in the years ahead,
provided the Russian governmentmaintains an open policy
towards such external acquisition of technology.
In Soviet times, as noted above, enterprises strived to
minimise their dependence on outside suppliers over28 The author is grateful to Silvana Malle for this insight.
29 This is a central conclusion of the expert group responsible for
revising the government’s strategy of socio-economic development to the
year 2020, see Strategiya-2020 (2012).
30 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GCR_
CompetitivenessIndexRanking_2011-12.pdf, accessed 12 September 2011.
31 Strategiya-2020 (2011), pp.52–53.
33 Russia’s sole builder of nuclear submarines, the federal unitary
enterprise ‘PO “Sevmash”’, Severodvinsk, provides a good example. On
the books of the enterprise as formal branches are a sanatorium in the
Crimea, another in Sochi, a pig farm and two construction organisations,
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sub-contracting, few small enterprises, and much in-house
provision of production inputs, or at least their supply by
enterprises of the same ministry, as this raised the possi-
bility of exerting administrative pressure to ensure reliable
supply. The latter applied in particular to the defence
industry, which in general exhibited a higher degree of
discipline in its economic behaviour than the rest of the
economy, as all understood that the sector had top priority
for the country’s leadership. In present-day Russia the
situation is in many respects different but there are conti-
nuities, not always evident at ﬁrst sight. The powerful
administrative structures of Soviet times have gone, as has
the unwavering political support which the defence
industry formerly enjoyed. Now, responsibility for fulﬁlling
the annual state defence order rests with prime contrac-
tors. They receive the budget funding for new armaments
and have to manage relations with lower tier suppliers and
provide payment for their deliveries of systems and
components from the funding they have been allocated.
But there is now a new factor leading to an aversion to
external supply, price ﬂexibility and unpredictability in
market conditions. Many of the lower tier suppliers are
now private companies and military-related work often
forms only a small part of their activity. However, in many
cases they are the sole Russian producers. According to the
prime contractors, they often charge elevated prices over
which they as buyers have little, if any, control. Being
obliged to pay more for inputs than originally envisaged
but faced with a pre-determined total contract price, the
prime contractors ﬁnd that their proﬁt margins are
depressed to the extent that contracts are frequently ful-
ﬁlled with little or no proﬁt, a situation that can lead to
lengthy and difﬁcult negotiations with the Ministry of
Defence for additional funding. This situation leads to an
outcome not dissimilar to that of Soviet times, but moti-
vated by price, rather than supply, uncertainty. In thewords
of a leading manager of the defence industry, the deputy
director for military production of the vast ’Uralvagonza-
vod’ plant in the Urals, the Ministry of Defence’s price
policy is leading to ‘a return to a “natural economy” of the
Soviet-feudal type, in which gigantic factories by their own
efforts made practically all parts for the ﬁnal product.’32
Prime contractors have an interest in maintaining in-
house supply or controlling external suppliers by incorpo-
rating them into corporate structures. In present-day
Russia there is another consideration that has to be taken
into account. Whereas in Soviet times transport costs were
extremely low, heavily subsidised by the state, now they
are much higher, largely, if not entirely, determined by
market forces. This is a factor pushing up costs in
manufacturing andmotivating interest in alternative, lower
cost and less unpredictable, options.
In the defence industry other continuities with the
Soviet past can be seen. The system of pricing of weapons
as hardly changed. Basically, a system of cost plus pricing is
employed, with a certain percentage of proﬁt, for state
defence orders limited by government decree, usually to 1532 Cited in Murakhovskii (2012).per cent. In recent years there has been much discussion of
adopting new pricing principles but with to date no new
methodology has been adopted. The evidence indicates
that within the prices of weapons overhead costs can be
extremely high, now a constant source of complaint by the
MOD as customer. One of the basic reasons is that many
enterprises still keep Soviet-era social infrastructure,
sometimes on a substantial scale and charge its mainte-
nance to overheads, which MOD representatives claim can
reach over 1000 per cent.33 Another legacy of the past,
relating to the underdevelopment of specialised sub-
contracting, with a tendency towards very large
‘universal’ enterprises, are very low levels, by international
standards, of labour productivity. These two factors alone
help to explainwhy theMOD is increasingly concerned that
domestically produced armaments are of high cost, at times
now being more expensive than foreign equivalents,
usually of better quality; hence a growing interest in
importing weapons. Another continuity with the past is the
continued existence of mono-towns, often experiencing
considerable economic difﬁculties in market conditions,
and the ‘closed’ towns of the nuclear industry, now some-
what more open than hitherto, which require quite
substantial budget support in order to maintain their
viability. Finally, although research needs to be undertaken
to establish the fact, the author’s impression is that a large
proportion of defence industry enterprise directors are
members of the ruling ‘party of power’, United Russia, just
as in the past they were invariably members of the
Communist Party, almost all positions of responsibility in
the Soviet defence industry being covered by the nomen-
klatura system.
It is perhaps not surprising that the military sector still
possesses many features having their origins in the Soviet
past, partly because it was the part of the administered
economy that was the most successful – here ‘planning’
worked in the sense that the USSR was able to produce
modern weaponry on a substantial scale and was able to
maintain strategic parity with the US, but also because the
very nature of armaments production and procurement, in
any economy, does not take a directly market form. But
over the past two-three years there have been serious
attempts in Russia to adapt the arms procurement process
more to the market reality of the economy. As noted above,
the Soviet arms procurement system was producer-driven,
with the MOD a relatively weak customer. Now, under
civilian defence minister Anatolii Serdyukov, with his
background in the tax service, the procurement process is
being civilianised, with the creation of a special federal
agency for arms acquisition headed and staffed by civilians
(Rosoboronpostavka) alongside a separate agency, also
civilian, for licencing contractors and monitoring thebut it is likely that there is also extensive housing, sporting and other
facilities (http://www.sevmash.ru/rus/korp/ustav.html, accessed 12
September 2011).
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same time, the MOD is adopting a much tougher stance as
a customer, no longer accepting without question the pri-
ces charged by producers but negotiating lower prices
when possible, obliging contractors to ﬁnd means of
lowering costs. The model here is clearly the acquisition
system of the United States. In addition, the entire logistics
system of the armed forces is being reform, with civilian-
isation, the development of out-sourcing and the adoption
of practices normal in most developed countries. If the
present momentum of reform is maintained, Russia could
have a more market-orientated military economy within
the next ﬁve years. To that extent, a signiﬁcant Soviet
inheritance will have been overcome, marking a further
step in the progress of general market transition of the
country.
Finally, in considering the military economy, it is worth
noting that Russia is now experiencing more severe compe-
tition in another sphere, arms exports. The USSR was a large-
scale supplier of weaponry to other countries, but a major
proportion of these arms transfers were of a political, not
a commercial, nature, taking the form of free grants or
ﬁnanced by extremely generous credit terms with little
expectation of repayment. Since the end of the Soviet Union
Russia has steadily expanded arms sales and by 2010 had
reachedanannualvolumeofover$10billion.However, almost
all the arms exported are Soviet-era systems, admittedly
usually modernised, and the cost advantage Russia has
beneﬁtted from is beginning to be eroded, with new
competitors rapidly emerging, not the least China, but also
other ex-USSR countries such as Ukraine. From now on this
enhanced external competitive is likely to supplement the
increasedpressurebeingexperiencedonthedomesticmarket.
6. Some issues of structure and time horizon
It is worth reﬂecting on the analysis of Yaremenko to see
whether it may still capture some aspects of the Russian
economy twenty years after the communist collapse.
Central to his conceptualisation of theRussian economywas
its structural segmentation according to the quality of
resources available at each level, the higher the priority of
the activity, then thebetter thequalityof resources allocated
to it byadministrativemeans through the ‘planning’ system,
with the defence industry at the top of the hierarchy and
some purely consumer-orientated activities at the bottom.
At the same time, prices set byadministrativemeans did not
reﬂect the actual scarcity or quality of the production inputs
allocated. The establishment, implementation and moni-
toring of the priority ranking was essentially a political
matter, decided by the top Communist Party leadership.
Clearly, in the present-day Russian economy resource allo-
cation and pricing are matters of market determination,
suggesting that Yaremenko’s understanding no longer has
relevance. However, it could be argued that this is not the
case: Russia still has a relatively segmented economy in
whichpolitical priorities still playa signiﬁcant role.A feature34 See http://rosoboronpostavka.ru/and http://www.fsoz.gov.ru/ (note,
there are only Russian versions of these websites).of theRussian economy is the existence of a leading sector in
which the state takes a very close interest and also has
a sizeable ownership stake,withamarked fusionof business
and political-state interests, no longer, of course, the
Communist Party, but now to a large extent the ‘party of
power’, United Russia and those closely associated with it.
This leading sector, regarded by power as ‘strategic’,
embraces some of the country’s largest companies and
export earners in resource-based sectors such as energy,
metals and chemicals, plus a number of leading banks.
According to the annual Expert-400 ranking of the respec-
ted Expert Ratings Agency, as of 1 September 2010, the 50
largest Russian ﬁrms by market value (capitalisation)
included 22 in the fuel-energy industry, 8 inmetals, 4 banks,
2 in chemicals and 2 in transport (both of near-state status),
with a largeproportion of these 38 companies having a state
share holding. The remaining 12 ﬁrms were over-
whelmingly privately owned, in telecoms, food, pharma-
ceuticals, construction and retail. In 48th and 50th places
only were two machine-building companies, ‘Silovye
mashiny’, the leading manufacturer of power generation
equipment, and ﬁnally (with a value of 55.5 b.r. compared
with the 1st, ‘Gazprom’s 3788 b.r.) the ‘United Aircraft
Corporation’, the sole representative of the defence
industry, well reﬂecting the fact that this sector is no longer
a dominant actor in the Russian economy. In fact, of the 200
largest companies by market value, only 9 were defence
industry enterprises engaged in military work.35
Returning to the Yaremenko framework, other segments
of theeconomycanbe identiﬁed.There isa sectorof relatively
large-scale business, overwhelmingly private, in activities
not regarded as ‘strategic’ by the state, including the food
industry, most telecoms, and the retail sector and building
materials. These companies, someclearlycompetitiveboth in
domestic and international markets, are able to operate
without much state involvement, but it is reasonable to
assume that the larger such companies become the more
likely they are to encounter pressures from the state, perhaps
in the form of ‘corporate social responsibility’ obligations.
Thirdly, there is a quite large sector of smaller and medium
scale businesses, equivalent to the mittelstand companies of
Germany and other West European countries, which may
well have thrivedprecisely because the state has not hitherto
shown interest in their activities. These businesses are often
found outside the resource sector of the economy. They have
a very active association, ‘Delovaya Rossiya’, which has
become quite inﬂuential as a source of ideas for improving
the performance of the economy.36 It is in this sector that can
be found such innovative and dynamic ﬁrms as those in the
Russian internet business, which have succeeded in keeping
thebigUSactors suchasGoogle andAmazon at bay.37 Finally,
there is the sector ofmuch smaller companies, the true SMEs
and sole trader businesses, the development of which has
been stunted in Russia, not somuch by the actions of federal
authorities, but by local governments and agencies which35 From http://www.raexpert.ru/rankingtable/?table_folder¼/expert400/
2010/cap/
36 See Cooper (2012), p.13.
37 See Bradshaw and Weaver (2011).
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pressure, often motivated by bribe seeking. Thus Russia’s
present-day economy, like that of the USSR, is segmented,
this segmentation being shaped, as before, by political-state
priorities, but of a different character than before. In the
post-1991worldconcernaboutmilitarysecurity isnotaspre-
eminent as it was in the Cold War years, though still an
important consideration. Now there are more general
concerns about Russia’s economic strength and standing in
the world, accompanied by commercial and monetary
motivations, including, for at least some of the ruling elite,
personal access to wealth for themselves and their families.
However, the very fact that the political leadership regards
the economy in this way may well reﬂect inertia of thinking
and psychology in which ‘strategic’ and ‘security’ consider-
ations still loom large.
A further parallel between the Soviet economic system
and that of Russia today is the large scope for the state in
redistributing resources. In theUSSRadministrative control of
the domestic economy, plus the ability to shape the nature
andvolumeof foreign tradeﬂows, gave amplepossibilities for
channelling resources, in non-transparent ways, from proﬁt-
able, but lower priority, activities to costly, priority, activities,
above all enhancing the country’s military capability. In the
Russian market economy these direct instruments of inter-
vention and control are not available, or only to a limited
extent, but substantial rental incomes from the export of
hydrocarbons and other resource-based goods again gives
large scope for non-transparent redistribution: the present
day Russian state, like its Soviet predecessor, is one that
exercises considerable command over resources and this
powermaywell be associatedwith not dissimilarmentalities
characteristic of political leaders in both systems. In such
a situation personal rent seeking and appropriation are
unlikely to be absent.
One structural determinant of the Soviet past is still
present, but in a much weaker form. This concerns the
‘structuralmilitarisation’ identiﬁed by Shlykov. The system
of mobilisation preparation in the event of war or other
major national emergency still exists, and is still shrouded
in secrecy, but on a more modest scale. The limited
evidence available suggests that mobilisation reserves are
nowmainly restricted to the defence industry and that the
reservesmaintained are on a smaller scale than in theUSSR
and therefore have less impact on the rest of the economy.
However,while there is an annual federal budget allocation
to fund the mobilisation system, it appears that many
defence industry enterprises incur costs in keeping mobi-
lisation capacities, costs which are charged to overheads.
In the Soviet economy long-term plans were considered
important and much time and effort were mobilised in
order to elaborate them. Not only was there a ﬁve-year
plan, but also ‘perspective’ ten-year, and even twenty-
year, planning documents and programmes. Yet, paradox-
ically, Soviet enterprises and the system of economic
management in general worked in reality to very short-
term time horizons. As Kornai has argued persuasively,
day-to-day economic management often amounted to38 Kornai (1980), pp.217–33.‘putting out ﬁres’, resolving one crisis after another.38 The
commitment to long-term perspectives clearly had ideo-
logical signiﬁcance for the Communist Party, conveying
a sense of control and purpose to the population and the
outside world, but it may also have provided some sense of
security to the ruling elite. The situation in Russia is not
dissimilar. Faced with the spontaneity and unpredictability
of a market economy in a globalised world, the Russian
government has a considerable commitment to preparing
long-terms programmes and strategic documents for
almost all aspects of life, from national programmes of
socio-economic development, as the current one to 2020,
to regional equivalents, to ten-year state programmes for
armaments, energy, transport, innovation, science and
technology, etc. There is also much talk of the need for
‘strategic planning’ and this has become an increasingly
central concern under Putin’s leadership.39 This commit-
ment may represent in part inertia of thought from Soviet
times, perhaps even some nostalgia for the apparent
certainties of the past, but may also reﬂect a need, in new
conditions, for reassurance and security for those in power.
And today, when serious problems arise, the top leadership
also engages in a form of ‘ﬁre ﬁghting’, resort to what has
become known in Russia as ’hand control’, with personal
intervention at the enterprise level and the immediate
issuing of orders to relevant government agencies.7. Conclusion
This article has explored the extent towhich thepresent-
day Russian economy still possesses features inherited from
the socialist economic system of the USSR, with a focus on
themilitary sector,whichhas remained the least changedby
overallmarket transformation. But, as argued, in someother
respects the Soviet legacy lives on in the new post-
communist order. This is not surprising. The socialist
‘planned’ economy existed for over sixty years and became
profoundly institutionalised and those today in leading
positions of power in Russia are products of that system and
to some extent bearers of mentalities associated with it.
Amongst economists there has been much discussion of
whether market transition has been completed in the ex-
communist countries. While there is a good case that it
has been in some countries of Eastern Europe, now estab-
lishedmembers of the European Union, it ismore debatable
with respect to Russia and other member countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States. For Russia, the
undisputed principal actor of the military economy of the
former Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the phenomenon of
protracted transformation is the least unexpected. A strong
case of path dependency is not being asserted, rather
a matter of political-economic institutional inertia.
A ﬁnal consideration arises from the fact that it is now
twenty years since the collapse of Soviet communism and
during that time there have been many signiﬁcant changes
in the wider world. The process of globalisation has gath-
ered pace and major new actors have emerged in the world39 See Cooper (2012).
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Second World War settlement. More recently, there has
been a severe global ﬁnancial-economic crisis which, at the
time of writing, has not fully run its course. These processes
have led to changes in themarketmodel itself,makingmore
problematic the criteria by which the present-day Russian
economyshould be assessed. It has becomeevident that soft
budget constraints are not a phenomenon of the Socialist
economic system alone, but can exist in themost developed
market economies, where companies considered ‘too big to
fail’ can be subject to budget support by governments, even
by those with a strong ideological commitment to free
markets.40 Perhaps, after all, notwithstanding the reserva-
tions outlined in this paper, Russia is now much nearer to
becoming a ‘normal’ market economy.
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